On January 15, 2026, Sens. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Todd Young (R-IN) and Reps. Rob Wittman (R-VA-01) and John Moolenaar (R-MI-02) introduced the Securing Essential and Critical U.S. Resources and Elements (SECURE) Minerals Act (S. 3659 / H.R. 7126). The bill would create a $2.5 billion Strategic Resilience Reserve (SRR), an independent, wholly owned government corporation authorized to buy, stockpile, finance, and sell critical minerals, and the bill's findings cite China's ability to manipulate prices to the detriment of competitors. Sens. Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV) and Mike Rounds (R-SD) joined as original cosponsors. For U.S. mining, processing, and recycling companies, the bill would put a creditworthy federal counterparty on the other side of the price risk that has repeatedly stalled domestic projects.
Key Takeaways
| 01 | The bill authorizes $2.5 billion for a new government corporation. Section 101 authorizes the appropriation for the Strategic Resilience Reserve, which a seven-member, Senate-confirmed Board of Governors serving staggered 14-year terms would govern. |
| 02 | Contracts for differences could give producers an effective price floor. Section 206 authorizes them without setting their terms. In the two-way form the U.K. uses for renewable power, the producer is paid the gap when the market price falls below a negotiated strike price and pays the difference back when the market price rises above it. |
| 03 | The financing toolkit reaches well beyond the floor. Loans, direct purchases, futures and options, non-recourse project lending, advance market commitments, and milestone payments are all authorized, with equity available only as a last resort. |
| 04 | Recyclers and minerals the U.S. sources from China get priority. The bill prioritizes minerals where the U.S. depends on China, including rare earths, and projects that recycle or recover minerals from mining and industrial waste. |
| 05 | Oversight and foreign-ownership limits are written into the bill. A risk committee would remove participants more than 25% owned or influenced by a foreign entity of concern, the Reserve could not sell minerals to such entities, and its transactions would go into a public database, with any withheld for national security made public within three years. |
The legislation targets a market failure that has stalled U.S. mining and processing projects. China is the dominant producer of 19 of 20 key commodities analyzed by the International Energy Agency, with an average market share of 70%, according to the sponsors' one-pager, and it controls 90% of rare earth processing, according to Shaheen's office. In December 2024, China banned exports of gallium, germanium, and antimony to the U.S. The one-pager says China's market share "allows it to drive prices below a profitable level for new investment or production in the U.S. or its allies."
"By engaging in unfair trade practices and subsidizing mineral production, China artificially lowers the price of critical minerals, making it un-economic for companies to invest in domestic supply chains."
Rep. Rob Wittman (R-VA-01), House sponsor of H.R. 7126
Source: Office of Rep. Rob Wittman press release, January 15, 2026. Photo: official photo, U.S. House of Representatives.
The sponsors model the SRR on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, created in 1975 after the Arab oil embargo. An earlier version (H.R. 10378) stalled in committee after its December 11, 2024 introduction. The 2026 reintroduction arrives with bicameral sponsorship and endorsements from the Alliance for Automotive Innovation, the American Critical Minerals Association, Bipartisan Policy Center Action, the Breakthrough Institute, TechMet, Jervois, and others.
The SRR would be a new government corporation with a $2.5 billion authorization and a 14-year board. Section 101 authorizes $2.5 billion to be appropriated to the Reserve, and Section 102 places it under a seven-member Board of Governors appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to staggered 14-year terms, with one term expiring every two years. Board members must have expertise in critical-mineral production, use, recycling, or financing, and may not hold financial interests in covered mineral companies during their service or for two years afterward.
Two internal divisions would collect market data and assess supply-chain risk. A Division of Data Collection (Section 203) would track global transaction and price data, recycling rates, and supply and demand forecasts, including estimates of critical-mineral transactions involving China. A Division of Risk and Vulnerability Evaluation (Section 204) would assess supply-chain threats across defense, energy, agriculture, transportation, health, and emerging technology, and deliver a biennial assessment to Congress.
Allied governments could contribute capital. Partner countries could contribute at least $100 million each, adjusted annually for inflation, and each contributing country could name one representative to an International Advisory Council of Partners that advises the Reserve.
The Reserve could set an effective price floor for U.S. and allied producers. Section 206 lists contracts for differences among the Reserve's financing tools but does not define their terms. In the two-way form the U.K. uses for renewable power, producers are paid when the agreed strike price is higher than the market price and make payments back when the market price is higher. Applied to minerals, that structure would turn volatile prices into contracted revenue that lenders can underwrite, without the government taking delivery of every ton it supports.
Take a producer selling 2,000 metric tons of cobalt a year (about 4.4 million pounds) under a two-way contract with a $20 per pound strike price. In a year when the market averaged $15, it would receive roughly $22 million in support payments. If the market later averaged $23, it would pay back about $13.2 million. The example is illustrative, and the bill does not set strike prices.
The Reserve could hold minerals and sell them in a shortage. Section 201 authorizes it to acquire and lease land and storage facilities, and Section 207 allows sales when the Board determines that a supply shortage threatens economic or national security or price stability. Section 207 also bars sales to foreign entities of concern.
Section 206 lists six kinds of support, to be used with market conditions and each producer's financial condition in mind. Exhibit 1 sets them out.
Exhibit 1
Financing tools, Section 206 of S. 3659
| Tool | Function |
|---|---|
| Loans to authorized intermediaries | Channel capital to domestic supply chains and suppliers |
| Direct purchases, futures, and options contracts | Aggregate demand directly or through exchanges |
| Non-recourse project loans | Lending secured by a share of expected project production |
| Contracts for differences | Settle the gap between a market price and a negotiated strike price (terms not set in the bill) |
| Advance market commitments and milestone payments | Revenue certainty that de-risks new capacity |
| Equity investments | Available only as a last resort |
Sources: S. 3659, Section 206; SECURE Minerals Act section-by-section summary, Office of Sen. Jeanne Shaheen.
The bill builds in audit and transparency requirements. The SRR must stand up risk and audit committees within a year (Section 401), and the risk committee must remove any participant more than 25% owned or influenced by a foreign entity of concern. The Reserve would undergo an annual independent financial audit and a biennial Comptroller General review (Section 402). It must also publish a public database of its financial transactions. The Board may withhold transactions whose release would harm national security, but must share them with the appropriate congressional committees and make them public within three years (Section 403). The Chair must testify annually before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources and House Natural Resources committees.
For producers, a price floor addresses the price risk that has stalled domestic projects. Jervois describes its Idaho project as America's only cobalt mine. Its U.S. president says the mine cost more than $150 million to build between 2021 and 2023 but never operated, and the company halted final construction in March 2023, citing weak cobalt prices and cost inflation. A creditworthy federal counterparty on the other side of a price floor would change project economics at final investment decision.
"With mechanisms such as contracts for differences and advanced market commitments, the SECURE Minerals Act will be key to securing U.S. critical minerals supply chains."
Matthew Lengerich, President and Executive General Manager, Jervois USA
Source: Office of Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, "What They're Saying" release, January 16, 2026. Photo: official photo, Jervois Global.
For offtakers, the Reserve would function as supply insurance. Automakers, aerospace and defense contractors, and energy manufacturers would gain a buffer against export bans and price spikes. The Reserve could sell stockpiled material during a shortage, and its Division of Data Collection would track prices, transactions, and supply and demand forecasts. The Alliance for Automotive Innovation endorsed the bill on introduction day.
Both bills are in committee. S. 3659 was referred to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. H.R. 7126 was referred to the House Committee on Natural Resources and, in addition, to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The bill has two Democratic and four Republican sponsors and original cosponsors across the two chambers.
This bill matters most to miners, processors, and recyclers whose projects have stalled on price risk, and to manufacturers that rely on minerals sourced from China. The bill is in committee in both chambers and does not set contract terms such as strike prices. If you want a read on how a contract for differences could change your project's economics, reach out to our team.
© Copyright 2026 TC Policy Group, LLC (d/b/a Crawford Partners). The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and not necessarily the views of Crawford Partners, its management, its subsidiaries, its affiliates, or its other professionals. Crawford Partners is not a law firm and cannot provide legal advice.